Liberia Institute For Peace,
Democracy, & Good Governance
Workshop Report on the Implementation of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia, the Liberians
United for Reconciliation Democracy (LURD), the Movement for Democracy in
Liberia (MODEL), and Political Parties
The
Perspective
Atlanta, Georgia
October 30, 2003
I. Background
& Purpose of the Workshop
The
Solomon Asch Center for Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict of the University of
Pennsylvania hosted the Liberia Peace and Democracy Workshop on August 9th
2003. The Liberty Center for Survivors
of Torture of Philadelphia co-sponsored the event. Chaired by Asch Center
Research Fellow Dr. Al-Hassan Conteh, 24 Liberianist professionals (See
Appendix I) participated in the workshop.
The purpose of the
Workshop was threefold. First, to discuss the Liberian Peace Process and how to
implement the “Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia
(GOL), the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy in Liberia (LURD),
the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), and the Political Parties of
Liberia.” The second purpose was to make recommendations to help the National
Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) effectively to implement the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in a manner that will lead to and ensure the
speedy achievement of sustainable national peace, reconciliation,
rehabilitation, solidarity, reconstruction and unity as well as the
socio-economic and democratic political development of postwar Liberia. The third purpose was to send the
recommendations of the workshop to all the key stakeholders of
Liberia—including the Liberian delegations who participated in the Accra
Conference, the members of the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL),
including ECOWAS, the United Nations, the United States of America, the
European Union and the African Union as well as the Friends of Liberia, and
other international organizations working on Liberian matters. Within this
framework, the group discussed how to implement the Liberian peace agreement
brokered by West African peace mediators in Accra, Ghana. It also discussed the
next steps in the transitional process to democratic elections and durable
peace in Liberia.
This
report presents the resolutions generated by the workshop based on small group
discussions of political, reconstruction, security (including human rights and
humanitarian issues), and political tracks. These discussions were chaired
respectively by Dr. J. Teah Tarpeh, Liberia’s former Ambassador to Nigeria, Dr.
James Guseh, Professor of Public Policy at North Carolina Central University,
Dr. M. Alpha Bah, Professor of History at of Charleston College, and Dr.
Michael P. Slawon of the Consortium for International Development. Dr. Abdul
Lamin, a 2003 Asch Center Summer Fellow, served as the workshop's
rapporteur. Dr. Denise Michultka and
Ms. Silvana Gambardella of the Liberty Center also greeted the workshop and
explained their work with Liberian clients.
The Asch Center's Director of Refugee Initiatives, Dr. Arancha Garcia,
who was instrumental in organizing the program, welcomed the participants on
behalf of the Asch Center.
Section
II summarizes some salient policy issues from the peace implementation
literature and best practices. This is followed by reflections by Liberianist
professionals who we consulted prior to the workshop on workshop guidelines
that would constitute the next steps in the Liberian peace process. These
reflections served as the guidelines for the workshop. We are particularly
grateful to Dr. John and Reverend Judith Gay for sending written suggestions on
the next steps in Liberia. Section III presents the recommendations of the four
working groups.
II. The
Issues at Stake
2.1 The Implementation of Peace Agreement
Dr.
Conteh summarized the current peace and security best practices and literature
on peace implementation, which he defined as the process of carrying out a
specific peace agreement. In order to be successful, stakeholders must take
into account its ideal focus, duration, and evaluation criteria. Furthermore, the factors likely to affect
peace implementation include difficulty in the conflict environment and the
willingness of states to provide Resources and risk troops. Three factors are cited in this literature
as likely to affect peace agreements in a difficult conflict setting such as
Liberia’s. First are hostile spoilers, members of warring parties who may
support the peace agreement only to the extent that it maximizes their
economic, political and other interests. Second, hostile neighboring states
might be supportive of the peace agreement only if they perceive it as
unthreatening their national security interests. Finally the availability of
spoils, otherwise known as “tradable commodities,” (e.g. diamonds and timber in
the Liberian case) can prolong conflict well beyond the agreed cease-fire dead
lines and the formal signing of the peace agreement.
Specific
sub-goals reflecting obligations to safeguarding human rights, refugee
repatriation, free and fair elections, good governance and DDR (demobilization,
disarmament and reintegration) are set in peace agreements, although the
ability to realize them might be minimized by resource constraints. Policy
scholars have therefore strongly recommended that the demobilization of
fighters, and demilitarization of politics, in the short run, must receive
resource priorities if a specific peace agreement were to succeed. In the long
run, the provision of security, broadly defined, to include police and judicial
reform are critical. Also important is
the local capacity building for human rights, and the extent to which civil
society, governments and the international community complement each other in
the sub-goals attainment.
2.2 Guidelines for Working Groups
2.2.1 Political
Careful
thought should be given to revamping political and economic structures. Democratic institutions in the rural areas
in the past went scarcely beyond elections for the village chief. Bottom-up elections for county and national
office should be instituted. Funds can
be administered locally rather than always from the capital city. Rehabilitation of facilities can be
organized at the county level, once the funds are disbursed there. Management
of natural resources, in particular timber and minerals, can be done locally so
that the use of these resources becomes a cooperative venture rather than
remaining a centralized, extractive and exploitative exercise.
During
the interim period, institutions allocated to the various parties under the
Accra peace agreement should be under oversight supervision of the United
Nations. Qualified Liberians should constitute ministries, e.g., education,
health, agriculture, transport. In this respect, international counterparts
should provide oversight in foreign affairs, commerce, finance, planning and
economic affairs, the central bank, defense and police. At the same time, the
process of reconstruction should aim for national elections, no later than
2005. Elections should be
internationally administered. The obvious reason is that, until tempers cool
and time heals, no one from a given faction will trust a leader from a
different faction in handling elections matters. We know from recent experience that hastily patched-together
coalitions of erstwhile enemies never work.
Are elections and a government of national unity, including the
restoration of peace, and the several pre-conditions, likely in the time frame
provided by the agreement? The militia
should be disarmed, given incentives for doing so, including rice, clothing and
money, and brought to camps. Police and
judicial reform, which are critical for the long run success of the peace plan,
should be started.
2.2.2 Reconstruction
Resources
are needed for all aspects of the economy.
An option is to consider taking back the funds the Taylor regime
allegedly has in Swiss and other bank accounts. This should be complemented by
funds from an international donor conference under the aegis of the United
Nations, and foreign assistance from the European Union (EU) and other
sources. Reconstruction activities,
coupled with maintaining an International Stabilization Force will be very
expensive. The interim government is unlikely to pay civil servants all their
salary arrears, but some compensation should be given, and thereafter salaries
must be guaranteed. As a first step,
individuals claiming to be civil servants need to show their faces and be
acknowledged as alive, as legitimate job holders, and as once again on the job.
Their full salary arrears should be paid as soon as possible.
Roads
must be reconstructed and opened. Check
points, if necessary during the interim, must be manned by troops of the ECOWAS
Military Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL), and later by the United Nations Military
Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), until trained Liberian police can take over.
Water
and electricity should be restored to urban centers. Communication systems
should be restored, including post, telephone, radio and newspapers. Schools, colleges, universities, clinics and
hospitals should be re-opened. Urban
and rural gardens and farms should be planted immediately. The Ministry of
Agriculture should make plans for the 2004 rural farming season.
The
population and housing census should be conducted simultaneously with an
assessment of physical and economic conditions around the country. It should utilize a detailed census form of
at least 1% of Liberian households. It
should include specific questions on the activities of household and family
members during the civil war, what assets they own, and what plans and
proposals they have for the future. In
addition to the census short and long forms, the census should identify
structures, facilities and personnel that survived the war, including schools,
teachers, health centers, health personnel, communication facilities, markets,
shops, roads, administrative buildings and personnel, commercial and
subsistence farming, and other commercial activities. A detailed assessment on the dynamics of population, including
mortality, fertility, and refugee movements should be made to provide accurate
data for among others, the accurate reconfiguration of electoral constituencies
as provided by the Liberian constitution.
Serious
recruitment of skilled Liberians in exile, as distinct from displaced and
refugee persons, should be started. Those who have the needed skills must be
sought, and not just those who are unemployed. There are thousands of such
Liberians in the United States alone, not to mention those in other European
and African countries. But in order to
persuade those Liberians return home, decent salaries and relocation allowances
must be provided. Again, this will be very expensive, so that recovered wealth
as well as foreign aid should be tapped to make this possible through the UN and
Breton Woods institutions.
2.2.3 Security,
Humanitarian & Human Rights
As
mentioned above, durable peace cannot be restored without demobilizing the
various militias, including reconfiguring the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and
the various extant militias, for example, the dreaded Anti-Terrorist Unit. Two
things are needed for that to happen. First, there must be a robust
International Stabilization Force as planned by the UN Security Council.
Ideally this force should comprise tough, experienced troops from Africa and
other continents. The force should
receive Chapter VII authorization of the UN Charter to engage in peace
enforcement. Second, the various militias must be given incentives, monetary,
training, and otherwise, to give up their weapons and become successful
civilians again. If there are no incentives, then rebels will continue to make
their living the only way they know: by the gun.
Refugees
and Internally Displaced People (IDPs) should be given help to return to their
villages. Exiles in the Diaspora must
also be encouraged and assisted to return from Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea,
Sierra Leone, the United States and elsewhere. This, too, will cost a lot of
money, which should be taken from Liberia’s recovered wealth, and from foreign
aid. Who actually is a legitimate
refugee is not an easy question to answer? Can this workshop resolve this
problem? As a guide, for this purpose,
community leaders, both within Liberia and in the refugee camps, will be the
main source of authentication, but with those being rejected, having the right
of appeal.
Once
refugees are home and displaced persons return to their villages, a census is
necessary, as mentioned above. Before there can be any election of any kind, it
is necessary to identify who in fact are citizens of Liberia. In rural areas, this will include depending
on the word of chiefs, churches, mosques and secret societies. Otherwise it
would be very tempting for refugees from other countries to claim to be
Liberians.
Food
and shelter should be provided to returnees and repatriated people until they
can get on their feet. The World Food Program (WFP) and other international
humanitarian agencies, including Action Against Hunger, would be useful here.
2.2.4 Reconciliation
A
Truth and Reconciliation process must begin immediately so that all who
participated in the war can have a chance to forgive and be forgiven. Sierra
Leone and South Africa can be models, and experts should be brought in from
those and other countries to organize the process. However, the leaders should
be drawn locally from civil society as well as the Inter-Religious Council,
with Catholics, Protestants, Muslims and traditional believers participating as
agents of reconciliation.
III WORKING GROUPS’ REPORTS
3.1 The Political Track
As per the above
guidelines, Working Group I carefully reviewed the Draft Comprehensive Peace
Agreement that had been sent to workshop participants earlier. Group members
discussed thoroughly the document’s provisions and made the below recommendations,
which in their consideration have the greatest potential effectively to revamp,
with success, the political and economic structures and institutions of postwar
Liberia. They considered critical issues
that will ensure the popular and effective participation of the vast majority
of the Liberian people in all aspects of national affairs - including the
especially the political, economic, socio-cultural, financial, commercial,
civil society, NGO and governmental sectors.
After
nearly three hours of deliberation, the members of Group I consensually arrived
at several conclusions and positions that have the strongest possibility to
contribute positively and effectively to the potential of the National
Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) to expeditiously achieve significant
levels of sustainable national peace, reconciliation, rehabilitation,
solidarity, reconstruction, unity and democratic good governance in Postwar
Liberia.
3.1.1 Political Recommendations to the National
Transitional Government of Liberia
(NTGL)
- Members of the
constituent branches of the NTGL should perceive themselves, as well as
act, as members of a government of national unity of Liberia, whose top
priority and responsibility is to serve All the People of Liberia
with fairness, equity and justice, in order to lay a solid and genuine
foundation for the speedy and successful attainment and consolidation of
sustainable national peace, healing, rehabilitation, reconciliation,
solidarity, reconstruction and unity as well as the socio-economic and
political development of postwar
Liberia.
- Be mindful and
faithful to the trust given it by the people of Liberia and the
international community in its execution of the mandate for which it was
established.
- Perform their duties and
functions transparently under the watchful eyes of the people of Liberia,
and friends of Liberia, as well as the close supervision and monitoring of
the United Nations, ECOWAS, the USA, the European Union and the African
Union - who constitute the key stakeholders that advocate for a brighter
future for postwar Liberia
- Prioritize the
re-activation of the governmental ministries and agencies as well as the
public institutions, entities and corporations that are critical to the
smooth and effective operation of Liberia’s national affairs - and to
staff the leadership positions of the reactivated entities with people of
high personal integrity and selfless dedication to national service as
well as high professional competence and experience.
- Exert your very best
efforts effectively to implement all of the provisions of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in order to ensure popular commitment and
support for the Agreement both at home and abroad.
- In this respect,
prioritize and carefully plan to undertake and hold a Sovereign National
Conference on the Future of Liberia (SNCFL) in Monrovia not later than six
months after October 14 2003
- Resolutions and
recommendations of the SNCFL, as well as the relevant internationally
accepted best practices and experiences should constitute an important
basis for the collective development and implementation of a National
Road Map that will contribute to the speedy attainment and
consolidation of sustainable national peace, reconciliation,
rehabilitation, solidarity, reconstruction and unity as well as the
political, economic and social development and progress of postwar
Liberia.
- Ensure that those
conference resolutions and recommendations that require constitutional
amendments will be subsequently put to a national referendum, which the
NTGL should organize not later than October 14, 2004.
- In the same vein,
verify that those Conference resolutions and recommendations that require
legislative actions will be properly and expeditiously prepared and
submitted to the National Transitional Legislative Assembly (NTLA) for the
timely and appropriate action of that Body not later than three months
after the SNCFL.
- Prioritize, plan, and
establish a national system of local government administration and
decentralization to put in place an effective democratic participation of
the majority of the people of Liberia in the affairs and governance of
their country from the community to the national level. In this respect, the NTGL should prioritize
and put into place and actively support an internationally credible
judicial reform program not later than four months after taking over the
governance of Liberia. The seriousness and success of this program will
help to promote respect for the rule of law in postwar Liberia, as well as
serve to ascertain national and international confidence in Liberia’s
judicial capability and administration of justice. Success in this area will serve to
create a positive environment for both national and foreign entrepreneurs,
as well as major multinational corporations wishing to invest in postwar
Liberia.
- Establish, and
actively support, an internationally credible Public and Civil Service
Reform Program that will serve as the lead engine for ending the pervasive
corruption, nepotism, sectionalism, ethnicism and the patronage system
that characterized and adversely
affected the public and civil service system of Liberia in the past.
- Establish a
nationally and internationally acceptable non-partisan and professional
Independent National Elections Commission (INEC) charged with and
responsible for the following:
i.
Carefully review and
update of the current Elections Laws of Liberia to internationally
acceptable standard and submit it to the NTLA for enactment into law.
ii.
Undertake an
internationally credible Voters’ Education & Training of Elections
Officials and Personnel Program.
iii.
Conduct the general and
presidential elections of Liberia time, as decided by the peace agreement, in
order to restore genuine constitutional rule in post war Liberia.
iv Work
closely with the United Nations and other members of the International Contact
Group on Liberia (ICGL) to establish a National War Crimes Tribunal (NWCT) with
the mandate to put on trial all those - Liberians and non-Liberians, who are
accused of, and indicted for committing human rights violations as well as
economic crimes against the people of Liberia and the Liberian State. The
purpose of the NWCT include the following:
(A) To end the culture of violence and impunity that has
characterized and dominated all aspects of national life in Liberia -
especially since the violent overthrow of the Tolbert Administration on April
12, 1980 to the present.
(B) To contribute to the process of national healing,
reconciliation, solidarity, building, unification as well as the development,
consolidation and promotion of a culture of national peace, equity, justice,
solidarity and unity as well as the Political, Economic and Social Development
of Postwar Liberia for the benefit of all Liberians and foreign
residents in Liberia.
3.1.2
Economic Recommendations
- The NTGL should
prioritize and undertake the preparation, introduction and active
implementation of a Comprehensive National Program for the Social
Re-Integration & Economic Re-Development of Postwar Liberia. The
emphasis of this program should be on the following activities:
(a)
Proper repatriation and
resettlement of Internally Displaced Liberians and Liberian refugees from
abroad into suitably prepared, as well as their preferred rural and urban areas
of origin prior to their civil war-induced displacement.
(b)
Development, support
and promotion of rural agricultural and related economic activities that are
designed and intended to ensure productive and income-generating engagements as
well as employment opportunities for the rural dwellers of postwar Liberia
(c)
Development, support
and promotion of urban-based business, entertainment, industrial, commercial,
technical and related economic and entrepreneurial activities to ensure various
levels of productive and income-generating activities and employment
opportunities for the urban dwellers of postwar Liberia.
- The interim regime
should prioritize, carefully study, introduce and actively implement a National Private
Sector Indigenization Program that is designed to enable Liberian citizens
actively to participate in and play leading roles in the “Commanding
Heights” of the Liberian economy. The Liberian Program could be a
modified version of the Indigenization Program, which Nigeria introduced
in the early 1970s to enable Nigerians citizens to take control of the
“Commending Heights” of the Nigerian economy. The Liberian Indigenization
Program should emphasize the following:
(a)
Ensure that a
significant part of the Liberian economy is actually set aside for the sole
participation of bona fide Liberian citizens.
(b)
Facilitate the
provision of loan guarantees for suitably qualified, experienced and motivated
Liberians who wish to borrow the requisite funds to undertake various types and
levels of business activities.
© Exert
the NTGL’s best efforts to encourage and work with interested international
organizations and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to assist in providing
business and entrepreneurial skills training and education as well as various
types of small loans capital and/or grants to Liberians interested in going
into private business.
- The interim
government should exert its best efforts to work with the College of Business and
Public Administration of the University of Liberia, as well as lower level senior and
post-secondary, public
institutions to provide various standards of accelerated and high
quality training and educational programs in various fields, including
Economics, Business Management, Business Finance and entrepreneurship for
various levels of suitably qualified Liberians interested in going into
private business.
- Expatriates
interested in participating in the commercial Sector of the Liberian
economy should be required to seek out Liberian nationals that are in
business and/or interested in business to establish legal partnership with
them.
5.
The NTGL should enforce
the immigration laws, which require alien compliance in legally obtaining
residence and work permits. Effective
enforcement of these or any other laws of Liberia will serve significantly to
reduce and/or discourage the existing practice where foreign traders, including
Lebanese and Indian businessmen, employ relatives instead of chronically
unemployed Liberian nationals.
6.
The capacity of the
Liberian Marketing Association (LMA) should be developed as a wholesale
importer and national distributor of certain categories of commodities,
including rice, cooking oil, pig feet, chicken parts, etc -- that are critical
part of the Liberian diet and market. Towards this end, the NTGL should
undertake the following:
(a)
Provide LMA members
with opportunities to acquire the requisite business education and training as
well as acquire entrepreneurial, financial, technical and related support
systems to enable the association to operate effectively and competitively
throughout Liberia
(b)
Require non-Liberians
who are desirous of participating in the commercial sector of the Liberian
economy to deposit fix amounts of funds in government designated financial institutions
as investment guarantee. This would
discourage, or end, the negative practice of
“fly by night” expatriate business people” who lack genuine commitment
to the well being of the Liberian economy and the people of Liberia.
- The NTGL should prioritize
reforming and strengthening Liberia’s judicial system. Emphasis should be
on the qualification, integrity, dedication, honesty and motivation as
well as commitment to the rule of law by the various levels of personnel
in Liberia’s court and legal system that are charged with the
responsibility to lead and dispassionately administer justice. This would mean holding accountable
officials enforcing corporate agreements, and related legal activities and
obligations. It would also enable a predictable and reliable system that
is capable of winning the trust, confidence, and praise of the owners of
small business entities, as well as actual or potential, Liberian and
foreign investors in the Liberian economy. This will build confidence in
Liberia’s justice system that would serve as the best form of national and
international incentive to attract significant levels of foreign private
investments in postwar Liberia.
- The NTGL should fully
accept civil society as its national partners and work closely and collaboratively
with it in organizing the private sector and the NGO sector as legitimate
stakeholders of the Liberian society.
3.2 Reconstruction & Development Track
The
Working Group on Reconstruction also used the above-mentioned guidelines with
the following focus question: what are the next steps for implementing the
Liberian Peace Agreement? The group had a lively discussion on the topic of
reconstruction and development of Liberia, and reached consensus on several
points. But it disagreed with the point
in the workshop guidelines above on recovering Liberia’s alleged stolen wealth
of $3.8 billion from past regimes. The group felt no one personality or group
should be the focus, especially when the amount in question was unverifiable. It was clarified during the plenary session
that the amount in question was verifiable, and attributable especially to
recent exploits of Liberia’s timber industry. For example, on page 18 of its
March 2003 report entitled “The Usual Suspects: Liberia’s Weapons and Mercenaries
in Cote d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone,” the internationally acclaimed environmental
research group, Global Witness, reported that Liberia had USD3.8 billion in
Swiss Bank Accounts. The group reiterated in its report that “The overall
figure for Liberian assets in Swiss banks is significantly higher; as figures
stated here are only from one type of account from which the Swiss government
allows statistics to be released publicly.”
3.2.1
Recommendations for Reconstruction and Development
The
group agreed that the NTGL should ensure that the following quality of base
institutions should be set in place or reestablished: (1) An accountable maritime infrastructure; (2) A wholesome
business climate; (3) a facilitated agricultural sector; (4) protection in the
exploitation of resources in forestry; (5) roads; (6) schools; (8) hospitals;
(9) radio and TV stations and networks; (10) power (electricity/light); (11)
safe drinking water; and (12) banking.
In addition to its detailed discussion on government’s role, and the
recommendation of the political track group above on what the government should
do, there was a distinct impression that the size of the government
should be minimized. The recommended
strategies of reducing government size include:
A.
soliciting assistance
through (1) grants and loans through various organizations, including the Paris
Club, for example, with U.S. sponsorship; (2) Ensuring that the short term and
long term goals are clearly set in implementing projects; (3) using the best
minds in the current Liberian government and the private sector, including
Liberians in exile, as stated earlier, to ensure a high quality of governance.
B.
Streamlining business
establishments to ensure that they remain vital and functional to the nation.
This should ensure that a business organization could be established within a
period of 48 hours to ensure fluidity. For large foreign business
establishments, the recommendation is to institutionalize a bank deposit of
between USD250,000 to USD500, 000, as practiced in Ghana, and some other
states, as part of their business establishment. This and related deposits
would serve as a guarantees that an incipient business is not a ‘fly by night’
business, as mentioned by the political group. Also, the interim government
should focus on revamping the Liberian Produce Marketing Corporation (LPMC) to
guarantee the reestablishment of the agricultural sector.
C.
Encouraging Liberians
in the Diaspora (especially the United States) to send remittances and gifts to
Liberia as a nationalistic strategy of promoting the practice of giving to the
country. Best practices to learn from include fund-raising activities among
Philippino residents in the United States, and fund-matching activities for the
revamping of a district in Philadelphia. The group suggested initiating a
fund-raising drive for Liberia in the near future to show concern for Liberia
by Liberians in the Americas.
D.
Focusing on
Leadership: The NTGL should focus on a
brand of leadership that would revamp the civil service and provide various
means for capacity building. The group agreed with its political counterparts
in this respect, especially with the establishment of school systems that would
assure access to elementary, primary and high schools, community colleges and universities
by all Liberians, irrespective of their rural or urban locations.
3.3. Security, Humanitarian & Human Rights
Following
a prolonged civil war with sub-regional implications, there is need for robust
international peacekeeping commitment to Liberia. The Working Group identified
the following key issues:
(1)
Endorse the
establishment of an international peacekeeping mission provided for by UN
Security Council resolution.
(2)
To enhance proper coordination, the
peacekeeping force should be under the auspices of the UN, with the
collaboration of ECOWAS and AU.
(3)
The NTGL should appeal
for direct US financial assistance for the UN peacekeeping mission in Liberia,
and to the UN in general.
(4)
Disarmament of
ex-combatants must be complemented by incentives such as improvement in social
services, including education, housing and vocational/jobs training
skills.
(5)
Assistance with
resettlement of Liberian refugees is central to long-term stability. Specific
incentives should include transportation, housing and farming implements.
(6)
The need for a reliable
census, as stated above, is very important to future economic development and
elections.
(7)
There is a need to
tackle international arms trafficking that has had impact on conflicts in
Africa as confirmed by international research groups, including the
International Conflict Group (ICG) and Global Witness.
(8)
There is need for
effective police training, health and job security.
(9)
Consult with existing
human rights organizations and activists, in and out of Liberia, on the
establishment of policies and institutions of transitional justice, especially
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, within the context of international
instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter).
3.4 Reconciliation
The Reconciliation Working Group agreed with the workshop’s guidelines
that a Truth and Reconciliation process should begin immediately. This would
enable all who participated in the war to have a chance to forgive and be
forgiven. Sierra Leone and South Africa
can be models, and experts should be brought in from those and other countries
to organize the process. However, the
leaders should be drawn locally from civil society as well as the Inter-religious
Council, with Catholic, Protestants, Muslim, and traditional believers
participating as agents of reconciliation as stated above. In this context, the group identified the
following factors and key points in its
recommendations on reconciliation:
3.4.1 Immediate establishment of a Truth &
Reconciliation and Human Rights Commission
The
commission must be independent of government. It should operate fairly and
impartially without any form of interference and or hindrance on the part of
government. Its members should be very
carefully selected from a cross-section of highly reputable Liberians of
diverse backgrounds. During its organizing stage, delegates should be sent to
Sierra Leone and South Africa to learn from the respective experiences of those
states, and also invite experts to conduct workshops in Liberia. Members of the commission should be trained
through workshops. Financial and other forms of support from both local and
international sources should be provided to support the establishment of this
and related transitional justice institutions.
3.4.2 Identification
of six (6) levels of reconciliation
I.
Intra-personal level -
self examination of reconciliation with respect to what you (the individual)
experienced directly / or indirectly during pre-war Liberia or currently
(during the entire civil conflict);
II.
Inter-personal level -
two persons examining their relationship with one another with respect to how
they behaved towards each other directly or indirectly (similar to #I);
III.
Intra-group level - a
closer examination of why ethnic conflicts continue to exist amongst members of
the same ethnic groups;
IV.
Inter-Group level - a
closer examination of why ethnic conflicts continue to exist between ethnic
groups of the same counties or neighboring counties;
V.
National level - This
is where the national government can be more effective in creating national
programs and public policy, by organizing town meetings, and/or enforcing laws
to support the reconciliation process;
VI.
International level -
neighboring countries. Countries who have supported the war, either through
providing safe passages of arms, sale of arms, financing and training of
rebels, etc.
3.4.3 Identification
of four kinds of conflicts that need reconciliation process
a.
Physical war;
b.
Hatred (resentment,
intolerance, discontentment, begrudging one another) war
c.
Corruption / injustices
war
d.
Political patronage
-
nepotism
-
favoritism
-
economic/social
inequalities
The
four kinds of conflicts listed above should be studied very carefully to answer
the following questions:
a.
Why do we fight amongst
ourselves all the time?
b.
Why do we hate each
other so much - where is this hatred coming from?
c.
Why are we so corrupt
and unfair toward one another - why do we perpetuate corrupt practices from one
government administration to the next in a never-ending saga?
d.
Why do we govern the
way we do - showing favoritism, nepotism, etc., thereby promoting economic and
social inequalities within our society?
3.4.4 Implementation
The
process or implementation of reconciliation should be subdivided into two parts
to address two groups of Liberians respectively:
a.
Combatants
b.
Non-combatants (the
general civilian population)
Separate capacity building curricula should be developed for the two
groups based on the following approaches:
a.
Workshops in our
various communities, schools, churches, and mosques, throughout the country.
b.
Use of radio and
television utilizing all the local languages.
c.
Town, clan and district
meetings.
d.
Sport activities
between counties.
A
curriculum and set of guidelines should be developed for ethnic language
broadcast, packaging and disseminating the Commission’s activities to the
nation as a whole.
APPENDIX I: ORGANIZATION OF THE WORKSHOP
Dr. Al-Hassan Conteh, Chairman, Liberia Peace &
Democracy Workshop
Dr.
Abdul Lamin, Workshop Rappoteur
Dr.
Arancha Garcia Del Soto, Workshop Facilitator
Working Group
1: Political
Amb. James Teah Tarpeh, Chairman
Dr. Romeo A. Horton
Mrs. Elizabeth Brewer
Mr. Harvel Brown
Dr. Edward L. Wonkeryor, Secretary
Working Group 2: Reconstruction and
Development
Dr.
James S. Guseh, Chairman Dr.
Cyril E. Broderick, Secretary
Dr.
Judge Luvenia Ash-Thompson
Mrs. Berma Broderick
Mr.
Prince Massala Reffell Mr.
Moses Kerkula
Ambassador
Rudolph Johnson
Working Group 3: Security
Dr.
Alpha Bah, Chairman Dr. Silvana Gambardella
Ms.
Mala Thompson Dr. Abdul Lamin,
Secretary
Ms.
Angie Brewer Ehimika
Working Group 4: Reconciliation
Dr.
Michael P. Slawon, Chairman
Rev.
Dr. Napoleon L. Divine
Rev.
Walter D. Richards
Mr.
Fulton Q. Shannon, Secretary
Rev. Toby A. Gbeh
